TA106 (Muller)


Commentary 62 (to C55 Adams)



by Serge Patlavskiy

1 October 2009, posted 3 October 2009




[William Adams] wrote:

"<1> Serge Patlavskiy insists that consideration of biology has no bearing on the methodology of science <C51, <2>."  "<2> It is not rational to assert that science could be conducted without the use of the biological sensory systems."



[S.P.] In his C46 Bill states that biology is the common denominator for reaching the agreement between the disputants. My argument (namely C51, <2>) is that the question of biology is not germane to this discussion: the mechanisms of consciousness, as well as the schemes of the process of cognition are the same to all possible subjects of cognitive activity, including those ones with the grey skin complexion and six fingers on their feelers. In other words, I have not stated that "biology has no bearing on the methodology of science". Moreover, the methodology of science presumes not only recording the facts, but also constructing the explanatory frameworks. Also, I have never stated that "science could be conducted without the use of the biological sensory systems". I have no idea where Bill has taken this from.



Bill's main argument is that "<2> ... it is only our biological commonality that allows us to agree on the basic observations (the R-facts).", and "<4> ... Our science rests on our biology." Bill must have overlooked my argument that there are two different levels of agreement: 1) the agreement on the very existence of the fact -- it is partially dependent on the biological/sensor commonality, but mostly dependent on the commonality of the universally certified measuring devices; and 2) the agreement on explanation of the fact. The Intelligent Agencies stopped paying money just for proving the existence of the fact (as in case with the phenomenon of remote viewing) -- they pay money only for explanation of the fact (which may lead to its practical application).



By definition, the R-fact -- it is a reliable, well-documented fact, but such one that is still unexplainable within the frames of the available explanatory systems. So, to cope with the R-fact, it is not sufficient only to record it, but to explain it as well. Now then, the biological/sensor commonality has nothing to do with reaching the agreement on explanation of the R-facts, and, in final analysis, the very empirical observation turns to be not consensus-generating.



My argument stands: if the subjects of cognitive activity are looking for consensus in explaining the facts, their intellectual products must meet the same high quality criteria. Only the criteria of a certain quality being applied when constructing our intellectual products may be "consensus-generating", but not the "biological commonality".



[William Adams] wrote:

"<5> Serge raises the interesting case of the scientist who is also a religionist. How does such a person justify truth claims about religion, since religion has no empirical foundation? One possibility is that the person adopts a form of Deism, in which God created the world in the beginning then stepped away, never to intervene again, allowing the scientists to take over. That makes a certain amount of sense, although it does rule out the possibility that prayer could be efficacious."



[S.P.] I am justifying "truth claims" not about religion, but about some intellectual product called "Religion".  My argument is that Religion, as any other intellectual product, must have its D-level, or the level of description and empirical observation, and it, in fact, has. All possible belief systems (as the MT-level intellectual products) have their correspondent empirical bases -- this is unseen only for those who do not want to see this. So, the absence of empirical basis is not in which Religion differs from Science. Most belief systems (as the intellectual products) do not meet the criteria of scientific correctness, and it is only in which they differ from scientifically correct Science (sorry for tautology; I mean that there are many modern "scientific" theories that do not meet the criteria of scientific correctness as well).



Summing up our discussion on the distinction and commonality between Science and Religion, I must admit that I am not persuaded by the arguments Bill has expressed. In fact, most of my arguments stayed unaddressed. I am looking at the discussed problem from a somewhat distanced position: I treat both Science and Religion as two intellectual products which are taken by some theory as its equally legitimate objects of study (I mean the Applied ADC Theory). Bill seems to be looking at this problem from within Science alone.



And, the final remark. Even if we lack arguments, we, all the same, should not let ourselves crossing the ad hominem borderline. I mean that the speculations that I am "the scientist who is also a religionist", or that I am a person who "adopts a form of Deism" makes me feel, speaking mildly, uncomfortable. Indeed, what serious matters can be discussed with a person who is possibly a Deistic religionist, or is stout and tall, or has not got the USA passport? But, forget it!




Serge Patlavskiy

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