TA106 (Muller)


Commentary 51 (to C46 by Adams)


by Serge Patlavskiy
17 September 2009, posted 26 September 2009




[William Adams] wrote:

"And we agree because our biological sense receptors and language  cultures are similar.   Biology is the common denominator."



[S.P.] The question of biology is not germane to this discussion  altogether.  But, let us be methodical.  The case is that as a scientist, I feel myself better (just like a fish in water) if I ground my reasoning on some ubiquitously applicable universal principles, models, laws, and theories.  But, when I see the total absence of any theoretical instruments (like in case of consciousness studies), I try to fill up this gap -- I try to construct the required explanatory framework myself.  So, I apologize in advance for my doing this. Now then, I have formulated a law according to which all exemplars of consciousness are equal as to their mechanisms, so their potentialities (see my C33 TA106 at http : // www .kjf.ca/ 106-C33PAT.htm).  This means that the mechanisms of consciousness, as well as the schemes of the process of cognition are the same to all possible subjects of cognitive activity, including those ones with the grey skin complexion and six fingers on their feelers.



If the subjects of cognitive activity are looking for consensus, their intellectual products must meet the same quality criteria (like the formulated in my C42 TA106 <6> "Criteria of scientific correctness"; at http : // www .kjf.ca/ 106-C42PAT.htm).  Only certain quality criteria may be "consensus-generating", but not the "biological commonality".



[William Adams] wrote:

"However, it is not possible for a scientist and a religionist to reach consensus on fundamental descriptions because despite a shared language, one group does not make use of the consensus-generating layer of biological commonality."



[S.P.] It was funny to learn that scientists and "religionists" differ in their biological organization.  Moreover, I can hardly imagine how Bill's idea may be applied in a case when the scientist and "religionist" is the same person.  The irony is that sometimes it is not possible "to reach consensus on fundamental descriptions" even for scientists from neighbouring laboratories within the same research institution (I know this from my personal experience).  The same may be said also about the "religionists" belonging to the same confession. In both cases, the discussions often result in "wigs on the green".  :-)   The problem is that one and the same R-fact (I have coined this term as a collective name for the Reliable, commonly observable / perceptible, scientifically well established facts) may be interpreted from different stand-points, using different models, including those based on the different meta-theoretical principles (see [1], p. 16 for the list of R-facts).


We may find consensus in the question that we do observe/register/percept something (like in a case with the UFO, or with the phenomenon of anomalous information acquisition), but we cannot reach consensus in explaining the observed fact. So, the very empirical observation is not consensus-generating yet. (For more on this question see my TA74 at http : // www. kjf.ca /74-TAPAT.htm).



[William Adams] wrote:

"Probably this last dispute is based on a false dichotomy derived from preconceptions about "levels" and hierarchy.  My point is that to exclude the D-level in attempting to revise the communal epistemology is a mistake.  I think a better strategy is to examine in detail exactly what constitutes an empirical observation and its description."



[S.P.] I must have missed something here.  As follows from the spirit of Bill's post, Religion lacks the D-level and in this it differs from Science, but now he says that we should not exclude that level.  Isn't here some contradiction ?



If we talk about Religion, and take it to be some intellectual product, then we must accept that it may be on any of four levels, including the D-level (the level of description and observation).  The theory (that one which takes any intellectual product as its object of study; I call it the Applied ADC Theory -- the theory of appearance, development and compatibility of intellectual products; see [2]) holds that whatever intellectual product we take, we should take into account its four (nor more nor less) levels.   Even if we say that Religion -- it is some belief system (i.e., it is the MT-level intellectual product), we all the same must remember that there necessarily are other three levels which are just not actualized in this concrete discussion, or in this concrete context.  For more on this question, see my C1 (TA106), C24 (TA81-82) and C5 (TA88).






[1] http : //www. serge-patlavskiy.webs. com/KeyIngredients.pdf


[2] http : //www. serge-patlavskiy.webs. com/ADC-theory.html




Serge Patlavskiy

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